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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

FAR EAST COMMAND

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

14 April 1952

PERSONAL

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Dear Bedell:

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As Japan approaches sovereignty, I want to pass on to you some of my thoughts could strengthen or weaken the relations of our

military forces with the Japanese Government and people.

In Japan we have been aiming at establishing a military intelligence system which can continue to operate effectively even after Japan becomes a sovereign nation. With this in mind we have established a policy of forthright integrity in our dealings with the Japanese, subjugal acquisition of intelligence within Japan to the establishment of harmonious

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working relations with the embryo Japanese military forces

The next few months will be critical ones. The regaining of complete sovereignty after seven years of foreign occupation will require a tremendous readjustment of outlook and thinking, despite our past efforts to make the transition gradual. The new government, the military and the people themselves will continue during this period to depend on us for guidance, but they will at the same time feel their new position as partners in a joint effort. They will be hypersensitive to any signs of Occupation carry-overs. Anti-U.S. factions will be trying by every conceivable means to compromise our position; criticism will be unrestricted. Clever and well-directed Communist propaganda playing on the theme of a U.S. dominated Japan has been increasing in volume and intensity; agitation by Communist elements in Japan, although so far ineffective, has been assuming an increasingly dangerous pattern, and even the non-Communist population is by no means unanimous in welcoming us as Security Forces. We must guard against any action which might provide a basis for further propaganda or doubt as to

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our intentions.

TOP SECRET

I believe that the Occupation, by painstaking efforts, has built up a large fund of trust and confidence among the Japanese people. In order to retain it, it is essential that we convince them that our interests are coincident with theirs, and that we do nothing which would weaken or destroy this relationship, or cause them to view us as other than allies against a common threat of aggression.

TOP SECRET

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Security Information

I would appreciate any comments you may have.

Faithfully,

M. B. RIDGWAY General, United States Army

General Walter B. Smith Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington 25, D. C.